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ABSTRACT
DEFENDING A MODEST SEMANTIC BRUTALISM
by
Jean Pierre Cordero Rojas
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Under the Supervision of Professor Michael Liston
Scott  Soames  is  a  naturalist  propositional  realist.  Propositional  realism  requires  a
commitment  to  propositions,  propositional  access,  and  semantic  properties  (namely,
representationality and truth conditionality). Soames' task, as a naturalist propositional realist, is
to give appropriate explanations of the entities in question in terms of a naturalist base ontology.
In contrast, brutalism (of any sort) holds that some facts are brute or unexplainable in terms of
some base  ontology. I  argue  that  at  least  one semantic  fact  in  particular—that  propositional
representationality bears the property I call Tight Connection—remains unexplained even given
Soames'  efforts.  I  argue  that  there is  no route available  for  Soames to  explain  the  fact  that
propositional  representationality  bears  Tight  Connection  in  terms  of  his  own base  ontology.
Therefore,  I  argue  that  we  should  endorse  the  view  that  at  least  one  fact  about  semantic
properties (namely, that propositional representationality bears Tight Connection) is a brute one.
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Defending a Modest Semantic Brutalism
1. Introduction
Scott Soames has given a theory of propositions which aims to naturalize propositional
realism (with  all  its  core  commitments)  while  changing  our  understanding  of  propositions,
semantic properties, and propositional access so as to abandon certain traditionalist commitments
which would render these phenomena unnaturalizable. In particular, Soames endorses a principle
of optimistic naturalism as opposed to brutalism, particularly semantic brutalism, which asserts
that some facts about semantic properties are brute (that is to say, true without explanation). I
argue that even if we grant Soames the base ontology he needs in order to give the explanatory
account of propositions, semantic properties, and access he offers, Soames will not be able to
explain at least one semantic fact: the fact that propositional representationality bears a certain
property (which I call  Tight Connection) which it certainly bears. I argue that we should view
this fact as a brute fact. Minimally, we should be modest semantic brutalists and endorse this
brute fact as one which escapes naturalist explanation.
My  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  2,  I  recount  the  commitments  of
propositional realism,  traditionalism,  and naturalism. In section 3,  I  define the act/event and
type/token distinctions which play a significant role in Soames' project. In section 4, I present
Soames'  base  ontology  and  then  present  his  explanatory  account  of  propositions,  semantic
properties, and access. In section 4 I also mention in passing some problems his theory has which
will not be the focus of my paper, but which may interest the reader. In section 5 I defend my
claim  that  Soames  endorses  Tight  Connection.  In  section  6  I  present  the  problems  Tight
Connection poses for Soames (particularly, a kind of asymmetry), and the way in which the two
naturalist  routes  of explanation available to  Soames will  fail  in  different  ways.  Ultimately,  I
conclude  that  we  should  endorse  at  least  one  brute  fact  (the  fact  that  propositional
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representationality, be what it may be, bears Tight Connection).
2. Propositional Realism, Traditionalism, Naturalism
Soames is a propositional realist and a naturalist. Traditionally, propositional realism has
been at odds with naturalism. From a naturalist perspective, the traditionalist understanding of
propositions, semantic properties, and the relation of access which holds between agents and
propositions is seen as problematic. Soames (and others1) believe that propositional realism can
be naturalized. They aim to naturalize it by changing our understanding of the aforementioned
entities (propositions, semantic properties, and the access relation).
According to propositional realism, certain things can be said about propositions.2 They
encode our sentences, and they are the contents of our cognitive attitudes. They have semantic
properties (representationality and truth conditionality), which semantic properties they lend to
the sentences they encode. We can, in some sense,  access  propositions,  and in virtue of this
access we can assign propositions to sentences, as well as have them be contents of our cognitive
attitudes. Different agents can access the same propositions. There are motivations for all these
claims about propositions, but I will leave out presentations of these motivations from my paper.
Suffice to  say,  both traditionalists  and naturalists  like Soames accept  these claims,  and they
codify the core of propositional realism.
Additional  things  can  be  said  about  the  semantic  properties  in  question.  They  are
uncontroversially properties that exist, because they are at the very least properties of sentences.3
1 For example, Peter Hanks and Jeffrey C. King.
2 The  picture  of  propositional  realism which  I  paint  is  relatively conventional,  but  somewhat  exclusive.  For
example, it excludes Jeff Speaks' theory of propositions. This is not done to slight his theory in the least, but
rather  because  his  theory abandons  propositional  features  that  are  rather  important  in  this  paper's  dialectic
between naturalists and traditionalists. In particular, Speaks' propositions lack  representationality, which is of
crucial importance to this paper's dialectic.
3 Of course, someone might say that it  isn't  completely uncontroversial. What isn't controversial is that we do
apply predicates to the subjects in question (sentences) which have certain conditions of veridical application,
such that some sentences assigning representationality or truth conditionality to sentences are true. “Sentences
have representationality/truth conditionality” is a true sentence, and the subject (sentences) certainly exists. But
whether the predicates correspond to perfectly natural properties or something less simple, is another matter.
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Truth  conditions  are  conditions  according  to  which  sentences  are  true;  something  has  truth
conditionality  iff  it  has  the  capacity  to  have  certain  truth  conditions.  In  addition  to  truth
conditions, sentences seem to represent (“mean”) specific truth conditions in particular. Simply
put, meaning seems to be a finer grained notion than truth.4 Something has representationality iff
it represents certain  specific truth conditions. On a propositional realist  view, sentences have
representationality and truth conditionality because they encode propositions. Therefore, these
semantic properties belong to propositions first, to sentences second.
Traditionalists  consider  propositions  to be non-physical.  Often,  traditionalists  say that
propositions are non-spatial and atemporal. The claim of most importance which traditionalists
make about propositions is that they are causally inert, such that including them in a scientific
theory would make no difference, positive or negative, to that theory's empirical adequacy.5 For
this reason they qualify as theoretical danglers.6 In addition, traditionalists consider propositions
to be non-mental. That is to say, their existence is external to and independent from the minds of
agents. Hence, being neither physical nor mental, propositions are characterized as inhabitants of
a “third realm.” Traditionalists understand propositional access as a quasi-perceptual7 primitive
epistemological  relation that  holds  between agents  and propositions  (and nothing else);  it  is
called quasi-perceptual because, like perception, it obtains between agents and entities external
to and independent from agents. Because it is non-causal (seeing as propositions are causally
inert on this account), and it only obtains between agents and propositions, the access relation
4 Some philosophers (i.e. Donald Davidson) believe that sentential meaning can be expressed entirely in terms of
truth conditions. This project (truth conditional semantics) has been criticized by Soames as insufficient. Soames'
view is that meaning cannot be adequately expressed just in terms of truth conditions. It is a finer grained notion,
and one which stands apart from (even if tightly connected to) truth conditionality. See Soames (1991).
5 I am  not committed to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. But I do believe that our best scientific
theories should be empirically adequate before we have reason to accept them as true, if we do have reason.
6 Let us understand theoretical dangler as follows. A theoretical dangler is by definition a theoretical entity such
that  including it  in a  scientific  picture of  the world will  make it  no more or less empirically adequate.  An
empirically adequate scientific picture of the world is therefore always possible without theoretical danglers.
7 The term is Soames' own. See Soames (2014) p. 26.
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must itself be a theoretical dangler which in no way affects the empirical adequacy of scientific
theories which include it.
Traditionalists  further  believe  propositions  to  be  the  primary  bearers  of  semantic
properties: that is to say, semantic properties belong to them first. Traditionalists understand the
fact that propositions bear semantic properties as a brute fact, and the character of the semantic
properties themselves (and the tight connection that exists between them) they also understand as
brute facts. They don't believe these facts can be explained naturalistically.
Naturalists  stand  opposed  to  things  like  theoretical  danglers  or  naturalistically-
unexplained (brute) facts. Thus, they are opposed to third realm propositions, brutal semantic
properties, and quasi-perceptual access. The hope naturalists have is that, given a base naturalist
ontology,  these phenomena will  be satisfactorily explained.  This  hope can be generalized as
optimistic naturalism.  Optimistic naturalism follows from what I call  ontological naturalism,
which  is  the  belief  that  the  only  acceptable  ontology  is  a  naturalist  ontology.  Optimistic
naturalism tells us further that all true phenomena can be explained in terms of a naturalist base
ontology. The term  owes its  name to Ben Caplan  et al,  who employ the phrase in “Not the
Optimistic Type” (2013). Caplan et al  ascribe optimistic naturalism to Scott Soames as well as
Peter Hanks.8 On their account, optimistic naturalism is specifically a position about semantic
properties. I would prefer to call this position  semantic optimistic naturalism.  I believe that a
more  generalized  notion  of  optimistic  naturalism  is  available  than  just  semantic  optimistic
naturalism, and that this more generalized notion is more useful to us in the end. In particular, I
believe that Soames is an optimistic naturalist in this general sense about many things other than
just  semantic  properties,  and  that  a  naturalist  in  the  broad  sense  (not  just  a  naturalist
propositional realist) will be an optimistic naturalist about many things.
8 They also ascribe it to Jeffrey C. King, but not in the body of their text. See Caplan et al (2013), p. 586n4.
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Optimistic  naturalism  is  opposed  to  various  forms  of  brutalism,  of  which  semantic
brutalism is but one kind. Though semantic brutalism forms part of the traditionalist account of
propositions, it can stand apart from other traditionalist theses. For example, Caplan et al identify
Michael McGlone and others9 as holding a brutal view about semantic properties, and it isn't
clear to me that McGlone or the others are traditionalists. On a view such as McGlone's10 it is
simply a brute fact that propositions have semantic properties. Semantic optimistic naturalism is
defined by Caplan  et al in direct opposition to McGlone's semantic brutalism.11 Soames, who
presents his view as naturalist, also opposes naturalism to brutalism.12 I will follow Soames and
Caplan  et  al's  dialectic  by  characterizing  brutalism  and  naturalism  as  being  by  definition
mutually incompatible. To think otherwise is probably to define naturalism in some other way
than that employed in the existing dialectic.
My contention is that at least one fact about semantic properties is brute. I claim that it is
a brute fact that propositional representationality bears a certain property I call Tight Connection,
which  I  first  define  in  section  4,  and  best  define  in  section  6.  This  fact  is  such  that,  in
consequence of it being a property of propositional representationality, when a proposition bears
propositional  representationality,  it  also  bears  truth  conditionality.  I  specify  propositional
representationality here for reasons (namely, contrast with agent representationality) that shall be
made clearer in section 4.
3. Type/Token and Act/Event Distinctions
Types are very important for Soames' naturalization project with regards to propositions.
They are also important for Peter Hanks' analogous project. Due to the crucial role types play in
9 In  addition  to  Michael  McGlone,  Trenton  Merricks  and  Caplan  et  al themselves  hold  a  brutal  view about
semantic  properties.  See  Ibid.,  p.  588n35.  Note  however  that  Caplan  et  al hold  that  propositions  lack
representational properties, just like Jeff Speaks does (see footnote 2). See Ibid., p. 585n2.
10 Ibid., p. 576.
11 Caplan et al (2013), pp. 576-577
12 Soames (2014), p. 92.
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Soames' and Hanks' projects, their projects are jointly captured under the broader name of type
theory.  Soames has held different views at  different times about which kind of types do the
relevant work for his theory of propositions. Soames makes use of a distinction between acts and
events in his work. He employs the distinction in What is Meaning? (2010) and New Thinking
About Propositions (2014). The earlier Soames identified propositions as event types of a certain
sort; the later Soames identifies propositions as  act types.13 In this section, I will address the
act/event and type/token distinctions. In section 4 I will further explain the role act and event
types play in Soames' theory of propositions.
One difficulty facing us is that though the act/event and type/token distinctions can be
explained by employing talk of  participation, there are different notions of participation, and
explaining the distinction requires at least three such different notions. There is one sense in
which  agents  participate  in  acts,  another  sense  in  which  agents  and acts  both  participate  in
events,  and  a  third  sense  in  which  types  participate  in  tokens.  My hope is  that  the  use  of
examples will clarify the three different senses.
We begin with act and event tokens. Suppose that at a given time, Alice eats a cookie. If
we consider Alice's eating a cookie as a structured complex of some kind, this complex can be
divided into  Alice  and  eating a cookie. The complex as a whole is an event token (at a given
time). Alice's eating a cookie, standing alone (considered apart from Alice), is an act token (at a
given time). When Alice eats a cookie, she participates in the act of eating a cookie (in one sense
of the word). In another sense of the word, both Alice and the act token of eating of a cookie
participate in the event token which they are constituents of. It is difficult saying what an act is.
Acts seem to be properties or property-like, and it may be a necessary condition for acts that they
be properties of agents, but beyond this I cannot give a decisive method for distinguishing acts
13 The change of mind is described in Soames (2014) pp. 240-241 and 241fn16.
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from other properties. Suffice to say, I trust the reader will know what acts are (eating a cookie is
an act, being 5'3'' is not).
Prima facie, some acts have a certain resemblance hold between them, and some events
have a certain resemblance hold between them. Accordingly, act tokens and event tokens which
resemble14 can be considered instantiations of a shared type. For example, Alice's eating a cookie
at one time resembles (in some sense) Alice's eating a cookie at a different time, and Bob's eating
a cookie at another time, and so forth. These events have the event type of  someone eating a
cookie at a time.  The act of eating a cookie which Alice participates in at one time, then at
another, and the act in which Bob participates, are instantiations of the act type eating a cookie
at  a  time.  Specific  act  and  event  tokens  may instantiate  multiple  act  and  event  types.  The
participation  notion  relevant  to  an  understanding  of  types'  participation  in  tokens  must  be
understood as the relational converse of instantiation: types participate in tokens when tokens
instantiate types.
My  explanation  of  the  distinction  between  the  participation  of  agents  in  acts,  the
participation of agents and acts in events, and the participation of types in tokens is hopefully
clear enough. The act/event distinction is used in this manner by Soames,  and I don't know
whether his distinction is canonically used in this manner beyond the context of his writings. By
contrast, I have defined the type/token distinction according to its standard use, which Soames
abides by. In the following sections I will largely opt for  instantiation talk when talking about
types and tokens. Nevertheless, I will be using participation talk when talking about agents, acts,
and events.
14 Of course, it's not settled whether types exist for as many gradations of resemblance as exist, or not. Two entities
(acts, events, or otherwise) may resemble more than a third. Does this mean that these two entities share a unique
type which the third does not share? In some cases we want to say yes, but it's not clear to me that  everyone
wants to say yes in all such cases. But seeing as this question does not need to be solved one way or another in
my paper, I will set it aside.
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4. Type Theory: Soames' Theory of Propositions
As has been said, Soames is both a propositional realist and a naturalist.  As such, he
wants to explain propositions, semantic properties, and access in terms of a base ontology which
is itself naturalist. In this section, I will first lay out the entities Soames depends on in giving his
explanatory  account  of  the  phenomena  in  question  (propositions,  semantic  properties,  and
access). Then I will sketch Soames' complete theory of these phenomena using his base ontology.
Soames depends on the following entities: agents, acts (act tokens), events (event tokens),
types (act types and event types), a triadic predication relation (which holds between agents,
properties, and objects), and a property of agent representationality, which can also be expressed
as a representation relation between agents and an object's bearing a property.15,16 Some of these
entities  (agents,  agent  representationality,  predication)  are  entities  Soames  is  an  optimistic
naturalist about, but for which Soames has not given an explanation in terms of a more basic and
unquestionably-acceptable  naturalist  ontology.  Some  might  suspect  that  no  such  naturalist
explanation is possible for some of these entities.17
In the course of giving his account, Soames also commits himself to property-bearing
non-existent types: these are propositions (as types) which do not exist, but bear properties of
truth  and  falsity,  such  that  we can  say that  there  are  as  many truths  and falsehoods  as  we
15 However,  because an object  may fail  to bear a property,  even though an agent  represents  it  as bearing the
property,  this  relational  account  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  issue  of  intentional  inexistence  (namely,
seemingly successful aboutness aimed at non-existents). Perhaps this means that the relational account is a useful
picture but not a complete picture. Or, perhaps it means something else (depending on how we deal with the
problem of intentional inexistence).
16 There should be little controversy for the claim that Soames commits to agents, act/event tokens, and act/event
types in his ontology. But does he commit to entities when he commits to true sentences that employ the triadic
predicate of predication, and the dyadic predicate of agent representation? I suppose the existential commitment
here is of the same sort as that presented on footnote 3. In fact, I expect Soames to have some clearer explanation
of  just  what  predication and  agent  representation are.  I  don't  claim these  entities  to  be  ontologically  basic
entities, just methodologically basic for the endeavor at hand (they form the base for the reduction at hand, and
have not yet been reduced further, though Soames as an optimistic naturalist surely thinks they can be reduced).
17 The idea that conscious agents cannot be adequately explained in terms of physical phenomena is particularly
popular. See for example Levine (1983) for the beginning of explanatory gap literature on the subject.
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intuitively need there to be, even though some of the propositions bearing truth and falsity do not
themselves exist.18 Soames has been criticized on these accounts as well.19 I will be generous and
grant Soames all the entities which form his base ontology; in other words, I will not dispute his
reliance on them, at least for the sake of my paper.
I contend that even if I do grant Soames the ontology he needs to give his explanatory
account, he will not be able to explain all the semantic facts.  My claim is that whatever it is that
Soames identifies with the semantic property of propositional representationality is such that his
explanatory account does not actually show how or why this property itself has the property of
being  in  a  certain  tight  connection  with  truth  conditionality.  This  property  (call  it  Tight
Connection)  is  a  property  of  propositional  representationality  such  that  truth  conditionality
always obtains of its bearer iff and in virtue of the fact that propositional representationality
obtains of its bearer (where the bearers are one and the same). I believe we should all endorse the
the reality of this property. For my purposes, it is enough to demonstrate that Soames endorses
the reality of this property. I will give my defense of this view in section 5.
Soames' theory of propositions starts as follows. According to Soames, we begin with
agents. Agents can stand in a triadic  predication relation to properties and objects such that an
agent  predicates a  property of an object.  When an agent  predicates a  property of an object,
Soames says the agent also represents the object bearing said property.20 This representationality
which agents have is the property of agent representationality which Soames holds is more basic
than  propositional  representationality.  Whereas  the  traditionalist  holds  propositional
representationality to be primary, and explains agent representationality in terms of it, Soames
inverts the order of explanation. Soames believes agent representationality to be primary instead,
18 Soames gives his account of property-bearing non-existent propositions in Soames (2014) pp. 102-103.
19 See for example King (2014) p. 130.
20 Soames (2014) p. 95.
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and  holds  that  propositional  representationality  is  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  agent
representationality.21
Soames then tells us that when an agent predicates a property of an object, either the act
token (predicating a property of an object) or the event token (the agent's predicating a property
of an object) becomes representational itself, and then the act or event type of these act or event
tokens becomes representational as well.22 It is the act or event types which are ultimately to be
identified  with propositions.  Which types  become representational  (whether  the  act  or  event
types), and in what sense they are representational in comparison to agent representationality (are
the two representationalities  identical  or non-identical?)  is  answered variously by Soames at
different times: Soames has changed his mind about these matters at least once, allowing us to
distinguish between an earlier and a later Soames. The earlier Soames held that the event type is
the proposition, whereas the later Soames holds that the act type is the proposition. The earlier
Soames also held that the two representationalities are identical, whereas the later Soames holds
that they are not identical.23
Types can be multiply instantiated. Different tokens of the same type are possible. The
propositional types in question (be they act or event types) are such that when they are multiply
instantiated, different agents participate in the act or event tokens (albeit in different senses of
participation). Regardless, Soames thinks that an agent's participation in the act or event tokens,
which in turn instantiate the respective types, is sufficient for us to make sense of propositional
access24, and in particular multiply instantiated access, which is crucial to propositional realism.
We can present  the  schema as  follows:  A accesses  P just  in  case  A participates  in  T and  T
21 Ibid., p. 96.
22 Ibid., pp. 96-97. Soames says that “instances” (tokens) of these types are representational first, and that the types
are then representational because the “instances” (tokens) are.
23 Ibid., pp. 239-241.
24 Ibid., p. 96.
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instantiates P, where A = agent, P = proposition (whether viewed as act or event type), and T =
act  or  event  token.  The notion  of  participation  relevant  to  our  schema will  differ  based  on
whether we rely on act or event tokens, but otherwise the schema is roughly the same in both
cases. Different agents will be able to access the same propositions on this account, because
different agents participate in different tokens (act or event) which instantiate the same types
(propositions).
Soames' theory of propositions can be criticized in several ways. When trying to explain
de se propositions25, Soames claims that the difference between de se propositions and their de re
counterparts amounts to entertaining (accessing) the de re proposition in a certain way (the first
personal way), which is constitutive of a new proposition.26 This notion of “certain ways” is not
well defined. If I entertain some de re proposition while eating a cookie, does this give rise to a
new proposition?27 Probably not; but then what makes it so that some propositions entertained in
a  certain  way are  new propositions,  and others  are  not?  A second problem arises  when we
consider Soames' claim that an act or event type represents because every conceivable instance
of it represents28; given a sum of tokens, it still seems that the tokens may have different types,
and not all can be propositions.29 The earlier Soames also faces the problem of explaining why
the given types have representationality at all. It is false that types  always have the properties
that their tokens have (the bicycle type does not have the property of being rideable in the way
the bicycle tokens do), so an explanation is necessary as to why some types have properties (like
representationality) which their tokens have. A variation on this problem may also face the later
25 See Perry (1979) for an account of the problem of de se propositions.
26 Soames (2014) pp. 106-113.
27 The example given here belongs to Caplan et al (2013), p. 579, though they employ the example for a somewhat
different sort of criticism. Other versions of the actual criticism in question are given in Speaks (forthcoming),
pp. 14-15, and King (2014), pp. 132-133, with different examples being used.
28 Soames (2014) p. 97.
29 The cookie example was originally given to elucidate this problem in particular. See Caplan et al (2013), p. 579.
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Soames.30
These  problems  might  be  reason enough  to  reject  Soames'  theory of  propositions  as
inadequate. Be that as it may be, there is a certain strategy Soames should follow to answer his
objectors here. For example, the earlier Soames would overcome his objectors if he could give
the necessary and sufficient conditions according to which a type inherits some property that its
token has,  and in particular,  the conditions according to  which  propositions  (as act  or event
types) inherit relevant (semantic) properties from act or event tokens. Likewise, Soames would
overcome  other  objectors  of  his  if  he  could  give  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions
according to which some types, but not others, are propositions, or if he could give the necessary
and sufficient  conditions  according  to  which  entertaining  de  re  propositions  in  some  of  the
“certain ways” but not others is enough to generate new propositions.  It  simply remains for
Soames to give those conditions, if it can be done; if he did this, he would be giving a more
complete explanatory account of things than he has so far done, but an explanatory account after
all.  However, I don't think Soames can merely lay out necessary and sufficient conditions to
overcome the particular objection I have for him. I will flesh out my objection in section 6.
5. Soames' Acceptance of Tight Connection
In  the  previous  section,  I  gave  a  basic  definition  of  the  property  Tight  Connection,
defining  it  as the  property  of  propositional  representationality  such  that  truth  conditionality
obtains of its bearer iff and in virtue of the fact that propositional representationality obtains of
its bearer (where the bearers are the same). I attribute to Soames acceptance of this formulation
of the property. In this section, I want to defend my claim that Soames accepts this formulation
of the property.
Soames says: “To  entertain  the proposition that o is red is  to predicate redness of o,
30 See Caplan et al (2013) for a more thorough account of the last couple of problems raised here.
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which is to do something that results in an instance of the event type that the proposition is. The
representationality, and hence truth conditions, of the proposition are due to the representational
features of these possible instances.”31 He adds: “From this we derive [the proposition's] truth
conditions: the proposition is true iff whatever (namely o) it represents to be a cerain way is that
way (red); it is false iff o isn't red.”32 Here we see Soames associate truth conditionality tightly
with propositional representationality (such that he thinks he has explained the former now that
he has purportedly explained the latter),  and we see Soames say that a proposition  has  truth
conditions iff and seemingly in virtue of the fact that it has representationality.
We  must  be  careful  here  about  what  Soames  is  actually  endorsing.  For  a  given
proposition  P, it represents some  R (for atomic propositions, this is the same as an object  o's
bearing property F), and it is true iff it has truth conditions T. In a critique of truth conditional
semantics33, Soames points out that what a sentence  means  (represents) is not the same as its
truth  conditions,  because  sentences  can  be  true  given  certain  truth  conditions  which  they
emphatically do not represent. Though Soames' critique is formally given in terms of sentences
rather than propositions, we can import his conclusions to the case of propositions (seeing as, in
his view, sentences encode propositions, and inherit their semantic properties from them).
Soames' critique rests on the following observation. On Tarski's approach, a sentence in
an object language is true iff its disquotation in a metalanguage obtains. All necessary sentences
are  logically  equivalent;  it  follows  that  all  their  disquotations  are  also  logically  equivalent.
Therefore, for any necessary sentence, the disquotations of all other necessary sentences are each
viable truth conditions.  Similarly,  for  any given contingent  sentence,  the conjunction of that
sentence's  disquotation and some true necessary sentence's disquotation will  also be a viable
31 Soames (2014) p. 96.
32 Ibid.
33 See Soames (1992).
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truth  condition  for  that  contingent  sentence.  But  surely  the  sentences  in  question  (whether
necessary  or  contingent)  don't  mean  these  truth  conditions.  Therefore,  meaning  (or
representationality)  is  a finer  grained notion than truth conditionality.  Sentences,  on Soames'
view, have the semantic properties which they have because they  encode propositions, which
have them first. Therefore, we can safely conclude that propositions, like sentences, have truth
conditions which are more coarse grained than that which they represent.
In other words, Soames is not saying that for every truth condition of a proposition, the
proposition  represents  that  truth  condition.  What  Soames  tells  us  instead  is  that  when  a
proposition has representationality, it has truth conditionality as well; it seems safe to conclude
that  on  Soames  view,  it  would  be  impossible  for  a  proposition  to  have  truth  conditionality
without representationality. On Soames' account, truth conditionality is only possible  because
representationality has been given first. It is not difficult to imagine how this would hold even
from an analysis of sentences. What is a sentence that has no meaning, but has truth conditions?
A sentence without meaning seems to be no sentence at all. Similarly, it seems impossible for a
proposition  to  have  representationality  without  truth  conditionality.  That  is  because  what  a
proposition represents is also a truth condition for that proposition. Soames has told us this;
therefore, as soon as a proposition represents, it has truth conditions. This establishes the logical
equivalence of representationality and truth conditionality, whereas the fact that Soames seems to
ground the latter on the appearance of the former shows that Soames takes the latter to obtain in
virtue of the former.
6. Asymmetry, Tight Connection, and Brutalism
I  claim  that  Soames  endorses Tight  Connection  with  respect  to  propositional
representationality. Tight Connection is a property of properties. A formalized definition of Tight
Connection, which is generalized to any property and its given property bearer, may be spelled
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out as follows: 
Tight  Connection: For  some  property  F with  property  bearer  o,  property  F has  the
property Tight Connection iff o bears truth conditionality iff and in virtue of the fact that
o bears F.
If Soames endorses Tight Connection (which I believe he does) then he also must recognize (and
I think we all should) a certain asymmetry between agent representationality and propositional
representationality. The asymmetry is as follows: although propositional representationality bears
the property  Tight Connection,  agent representationality does not.  That is  because agents (as
property bearers of agent representationality) do not bear truth conditionality. All bearers of truth
conditionality are also bearers of truth value, but it makes no sense to say that an agent is true or
false. Nor does it make sense to say that given certain truth conditions an agent will be true.
Soames  believes  that  agents  are  primary  bearers  of  representationality,  and  that
propositions bear their representationality only in a derivative way, such that the fact that agents
are primary bearers of representationality  explains  why propositions bear representationality.34
The traditionalists  he opposes  believe  the  order  of  explanation to  be reversed:  propositional
representationality is more basic, and agent representationality is to be explained in terms of it.35
Apart from the  order  of explanation, accounts of explanation can also differ based on whether
the properties of agent representationality and propositional representationality are the same or
different.  Four  combinations  of  explanation  are possible  based  on two dimensions  (order  of
explanation,  identity  vs.  non-identity).  Call  traditionalist  those  explanations  which  say  that
propositional representationality is more basic and explains agent representationality, and call
naturalist those explanations which say that agent representationality is more basic and explains
34 Soames (2014) p. 96.
35 Ibid.
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propositional representationality.  Call  transmissional  those explanations which say that  agent
representationality  and  propositional  representationality  are  the  same,  and  call  focal  those
explanations which say that agent representationality and propositional representationality are
different (for reasons yet to be explained). Our four possible combinations are then captured by
the following table:
Traditionalist Naturalist
Transmissional Transmissional Traditionalist Transmissional Naturalist
Focal Focal Traditionalist Focal Naturalist
The  earlier  Soames  was  a  transmissional  naturalist,  whereas  the  later  Soames  is  a  focal
naturalist.36 For  reasons  I  shall  soon show,  I  believe  only the  focal  traditionalist  account  is
exempt from explanatory problems given a base ontology. By contrast, both available routes for
Soames will present explanatory problems.
Transmissional accounts are problematic, regardless of whether one is a traditionalist or a
naturalist. Transmissional accounts are called transmissional because one and the same property
is purportedly transmitted from one bearer (the primary bearer) to another (the derivative bearer).
A transmissional account of representationality will tell us the story of this transmission. But
such transmissional accounts are problematic because, when faced with asymmetry, they start to
look  impossible.  Tight  Connection  is  a  property  that  we  cannot  imagine  propositional
representationality lacks.  The property itself is defined in such a way as to capture this very
intuition.  It  shouldn't  matter  what  entities  (agents,  propositions,  or  something  else)  bear
representationality: Tight Connection is a property of representationality such that its bearers will
bear truth conditionality also. Yet agents lack truth conditionality. If anything, this would be a
36 Ibid., pp. 239-241. See also Caplan et al (2015). They distinguish between an “inheritance” view, corresponding
to the earlier Soames' view, which is transmissional naturalist, and an “extension” view, corresponding to the
later Soames' view, which is focal naturalist.
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counterexample  to  the  claim  that  the  properties  in  question  (agent  representationality  and
propositional representationality) are the same. Hence,  a transmissional account must explain
what should be impossible by its own account, and for this reason, neither the naturalist nor the
traditionalist fares well.
On a transmissional account,  if  the reason  Tight Connection does not obtain of agent
representationality is that agents in some way play a role in the identity conditions of agent
representationality  as  opposed  to  propositional  representationality,  then  the  account  is  not
transmissional after all. If instead propositions (as property bearers) somehow play a partial role
in making representationality have Tight Connection, or if agents (as property bearers) somehow
play a partial role in making representationality fail to have  Tight Connection, one must ask if
this  is  “just  the  way it  is”  or  not.  If  yes,  then  this  is  a  brute  fact.  If  no,  then  a  naturalist
explanation is needed. As I have mentioned, Soames has since changed his mind and abandoned
the transmissional naturalist account in favor of a focal naturalist account. For the remainder of
my paper, I shall turn our attention to focal accounts.
On  a  focal  account,  the  sense  of  “representationality”  invoked  by  agent
representationality is merely homonymous with that invoked by propositional representationality.
The name (“representationality”) may be the same, but the meaning differs across the two cases.
This homonymy is comparable to that which obtains between river banks and financial banks.
However, it is not enough  that  they are homonymous. Some homonyms (like river banks and
financial banks) may be completely arbitrary. By contrast, a close connection is supposed to exist
between  derivative  representationality  and  primary  representationality:  the  latter  is  taken  to
explain the former. Since a story exists to connect the two notions of representationality, with
one being a more basic and central notion than the other, the homonymy is apt because of this
purported connection.
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The above picture essentially illustrates Aristotle's theory of focal meaning.37 We may
explain  the  theory  by  way of  example.  Consider  for  example,  health.  A person  is  healthy,
exercise  is  healthy,  and  a  certain  complexion  is  healthy.  These  three  notions  of  health  are
homonymous.  A person is  healthy when its  body functions  as it  ought to.  But  exercise and
complexions  lack  bodies,  so  their  healthiness  cannot  be  the  same as  a  person's  healthiness.
Rather, they are “healthy” in a sense focused on a central notion of health (which applies to
persons) by way of some connection. For example, exercise is said to be healthy in a derivative if
homonymous sense, because exercise  causes  genuine health in the central sense. Likewise, a
complexion is said to be healthy in a derivative if homonymous sense, because it is  caused by
genuine health in the central sense. Focal accounts of representationality must explain derived
representationality  in  terms  of  some  connection  to  a  central  notion  of  representationality
(primary representationality). Because the representationalities are different, asymmetry is not a
problem for focal accounts in the same way it is for transmissional accounts.
Asymmetry  still  holds  true  of  focal  accounts,  but  order  of  explanation  matters  in
determining  if  asymmetry  will  pose  a  problem  for  a  given  focal  account.  On  the  focal
traditionalist account, propositional representationality is our central sense of representationality,
forming part of our base ontology as it were, in terms of which the focal traditionalist must
merely  explain  the  disappearance  of  the  property  Tight  Connection  in  the  derived
representationality  (which  is  agent  representationality).  This  is  rather  simple  to  do.  We  can
explain  agent  representationality  in  terms  of  propositional  representationality  by  giving  an
account of the former property (understood as a relation) in terms of relation composition38, with
37 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a33-1003b1
38 Relation composition (developed by C. S. Peirce and Augustus De Morgan) is a measure by which new relations
can be composed from other relations in the following way: relations Pxy and Qyz compose relation Rxz. For
example, the relation “is the uncle of” is composed of the relations “is the brother of” and “is the parent of.”
Adam is the uncle of Clara iff he is the brother of Beatrice, who is the parent of Clara.
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the latter property (also understood as a relation) being a component relation. As I said in section
4, it is possible for us to think of agent representationality as a representation relation between an
agent and an object's bearing a property; the same can be said of propositional representationality
(it is a representation relation between a proposition and an object's bearing a property). We may
say that A representsagent X when and just in case A accesses P and P representsproposition X, where A
= an agent,  X = an object's bearing a property, and P = a proposition. Given that we employed
relation composition, we may assert an identity between the left hand explanandum and the right
hand explanans: for an agent to represent (in the derivative sense) an object's bearing a property
is  for it to access a proposition, which represents (in the primary sense) said object's bearing a
property.
Soames recognizes that a traditionalist would give a focal, rather than a transmissional,
account  of  representationality.  He takes  the  traditionalist  to  explain  “the  fact  that  the  agent
represents o as red” in terms of “(a) the fact that the agent has a certain attitude to the proposition
that o is red, plus (b) the fact that the proposition—in and of itself and without interpretation by
us—intrinsically  represents  o  as  red.”39 The  focal  traditionalist  account  avoids  the  problems
faced by the transmissional  traditionalist  account  (given that  it  is  a  transmissional  account).
More importantly, the asymmetry is not puzzling here: if we understand the component relations,
we understand agent representationality (given that the latter just is the former), and we shouldn't
be surprised that the latter lacks the property Tight Connection, because composite relations are
under no obligation to bear all the properties which their component relations bear. Indeed, when
one  defines  agent  representationality the way we have,  it  is  especially non-surprising that  it
would lack the property Tight Connection.
On  the  focal  naturalist  account,  agent  representationality  is  our  central  sense  of
39 Soames (2014) p. 96.
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representationality. It forms part of our base ontology (just as I said it did for Soames in section
4), and it is in terms of it that the focal naturalist must explain the  emergence of the property
Tight Connection  in the derived representationality (which is propositional representationality).
Soames can follow the traditionalist in invoking relation composition here as well. We may say
that  P representsproposition X when  P is  instantiated by  T,  and  T is  participated in by  A,  and  A
representsagent X,  where  P =  a  proposition  (as  act  or  event  type),  X =  an  object's  bearing  a
property, T = an act or event token, and A = an agent. If Soames accepts an identity between the
left hand explanandum and the right hand explanans, then he must explain  why propositional
representationality has the property of  Tight Connection that it does, because the mere relation
composition account does not explain why this is the case. It actually stays silent about it being
the case that the composite relation has said property.
It is precisely for this reason (the silence in question) that I have a problem with what I
take would be Soames' further identity claim between the composite relation in question, and
what we all recognize (in a theory-neutral sense) as propositional representationality. There is a
possibility that the two are in  fact  not  identical,  and therefore Soames would be making an
identification  by  fiat  which  is  in  reality  falsidical.  To  avoid  this  mistake,  Soames  should
genuinely demonstrate that his identification is not merely by fiat, and therefore has no danger of
being falsidical. The problem is that Soames can only help himself to  Tight Connection, and
assign it to his composite relation, subsequent to the identification in question: it does not fall out
from the relation composition account of explanation at all. But it is  this identification move
which I think is unjustified. Only if Soames can give an explanatory account that does entail the
necessity  of  this  identity  judgment,  then  and  only  then  can  we  say  that  he  has  genuinely
explained representationality and thereby explained truth conditionality also. Until he has done
so, both semantic properties remain unexplained by his account. He has putatively explained a
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certain  something, but identifying this certain  something with propositional representationality
(which in turn has the property Tight Connection) is a further step that is not itself entailed by the
explanation Soames can give.
Suppose  now that  someone  were  to  say:  “You  are  not  charitable  enough.  It  just  so
happens to be the case that propositional representationality bears the property Tight Connection.
True, Soames' explanation does not logically  entail the identity judgment of which you speak,
but  some identities  are  knowable  only  a posteriori.  Soames'  theory otherwise  gives  a  good
account of propositional representationality itself (absent Tight Connection), and of propositions,
and of access, especially multiply instantiable access. Let the theory do its work, and if it  is
better  than  other  theories,  it  will  win  out.”  Suppose  I  accept  this  response  wholeheartedly:
suppose that I became convinced, upon this appeal, to grant that maybe the identity judgment is
veridical, and that given the virtues of the theory Soames is justified thinking it is. A problem
still remains. If this notion of “just so happening to be the case” is not explainable in naturalist
terms,  it is a brute fact, by definition. It is true that some identities can be knowable only  a
posteriori,  but  even  knowing  the  identity  in  question  (if  it  exists)  would  not  explain  why
propositional  representationality,  defined  in  the  Soamesian  fashion,  bears  the  property  Tight
Connection. If it  just so happens to be the case that it does, in an unexplained way, then this
counts as a bona fide brute fact.
7. Conclusion
If I am right, we should minimally say that the existence of at least  one brute fact has
been established: that representationality bears the property Tight Connection. Perhaps we ought
to be modest and restrict ourselves to just this claim and nothing more. On this view, we may
even preserve the bulk of the Soamesian system and accept just one brute fact where naturalist
explanation fails. That being said, I don't think we should be so quick to endorse the Soamesian
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system. As I said in section 4, I granted Soames his base ontology simply to show that even if
this base ontology was granted unto him, Soames would not be able to completely naturalize
propositional realism. But have all members of Soames' base ontology really been explained in
terms of a yet-more-basic, naturalist-approved ontology?40 I'm not certain of it. It is beyond the
space of this paper to defend my suspicion, however.
My hope is that by making space for some semantic brute facts, I am making space for
traditionalism more broadly. Of course, one would have to demonstrate additional explanatory
failures  by naturalism first.  I  cannot  do that  here.  It  is  enough for  me to show that  modest
semantic brutalism is respectable given the failure of complete naturalist explanation. That being
said, establishing brutalism about  Tight Connection  leaves open the question of which, agent
representationality or propositional representationality, is more basic. Traditionalists believe the
latter is more basic, and even that it is a primitive of some sort. Depending on whether we make
propositional representationality a primitive or a composite relation, we will assign a brute fact
either to a primitive or a composite relation. I would prefer to assign a brute fact to a primitive
over a composite relation. In a way, this is a matter of ontological taste, one I will not defend in
this  paper.  It  is  to  be contrasted with a  different  taste,  according to which we should never
multiply primitives if we can avoid it. Be that what it may be, we cannot avoid at least a modest
semantic brutalism.
40 The base ontology I grant to Soames is  methodologically  basic, not genuinely  ontologically  basic (for him).
What is methodologically basic minimally forms the base for an explanatory reduction of something else, but it
is not taken to necessarily be the true ground level of fundamentality. The claim that Soames' base ontology is
merely methodologically basic is one I present in greater detail in footnote 16.
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